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It is a euphemism to say that humans use tools. Humans possess
a vast repertoire of tools they use every day. In fact, as language
or bipedal locomotion, tool use is a hallmark of humans. Tool use
has also been often viewed as an important step during evolu-
tion (van Schaik et al., 1999) or even as a marker of the evolution
of human intelligence (Wynn, 1985). So a fundamental issue is,
what are the cognitive and neural bases of human tool use? The
present series of papers in this special topic represents the newest
additions to that research topic.
Central to that topic is the issue of the nature of the repre-
sentations underlying tool use. Most of our understanding has
come from the study of brain-damaged patients with tool use
disorders, also called apraxia of tool use. When asked to light a
candle, for example, those patients can light the candle correctly
but then put it to the mouth in an attempt to smoke it. Such
observations have led traditional cognitive models of apraxia to
assume that tool use is supported by sensorimotor knowledge
about tool manipulation (e.g., Rothi et al., 1991; Buxbaum, 2001).
Consistent with this, Gainotti (2013) reviews a series of neuropsy-
chological and neuroimaging studies indicating that perceptual,
motor, and encyclopedic sources of knowledge have different
weights in the construction of the different object categories (i.e.,
living things, tools) that are stored within the brain. This sensory-
motor hypothesis assumes that manipulation knowledge stored
within inferior fronto-parietal areas is critical to tool use skills.
This link is also suggested by van Elk (2014), who conducted an
fMRI study wherein participants had to predict the subsequent
use of a presented tool. His results indicate that the left inferior
parietal lobe might store hand-posture representations that can
be used for planning tool-directed actions as well as for predicting
other’s actions.
Contrary to the traditional cognitive models of apraxia, a
growing body of literature suggests that the left inferior parietal
lobe might rather support technical reasoning, namely, the abil-
ity to reason about physical object properties (Goldenberg and
Spatt, 2009; Osiurak et al., 2009, 2010, 2013; Goldenberg, 2013;
Osiurak, 2014). Support for the technical reasoning hypothesis
comes from findings demonstrating a strong association in left
brain-damaged patients between the ability to use familiar tools
and the ability to use novel tools to solve mechanical problems
(for reviews, see Goldenberg, 2013; Osiurak, 2014). Four review
articles of this special issue also provide evidence in line with the
technical reasoning hypothesis. Bienkiewicz et al. (2014), Orban
and Caruana (2014), and Vingerhoets (2014) emphasize that the
ability to understand mechanical actions might be the specificity
of the anterior portions of the inferior parietal lobe (particu-
larly the supramarginal gyrus) while the posterior parietal cortex
might be involved in the planning of the grasping and reaching
components of both tool-use and non-tool-use actions. In the
same vein, by reviewing studies investigating tool use disorders
in left brain-damaged patients over the last 30 years, Baumard
et al. (2014) suggest that the loss of mechanical knowledge might
be the core deficit in left brain-damaged patients with apraxia of
tool use.
Two experimental articles also address the issue of the involve-
ment of mechanical vs. manipulation knowledge in tool use. First,
Parry et al. (2014) examine both functional dynamics (i.e., the
understanding of the mechanical actions involved in the task)
and joint contribution profiles of participants with different lev-
els of expertise in a primordial percussive task (i.e., production
of stone flakes using the Oldowan method). Their results show
that when people learn a tool use activity what they learn is
the functional dynamics rather than any particular movement
per se. Second, Müsseler et al. (2014) asked participants to use
lever tools or to imagine using them in order to explore the role
played in response generation by the spatial compatibility rela-
tionships between stimulus (S; at which the effect points of the
lever aims at), responding hand (R) and effect point of the lever
(E). They observed that the most prominent compatibility effects
were for RE compatibility, corroborating the idea that even in
tool use planning is influenced not only by the spatial relation-
ship between stimulus and response, but also by the intended
action effects. Similar results are reported by Rieger et al. (2014),
who had participants perform circling movements with a sty-
lus (movement) and presented distorted visual feedback of the
movements on a screen (visual effect). When participants had to
synchronize the visual feedback dot with a second, rotating stimu-
lus on the screen (stimulus), strong compatibility effects emerged
for the relationship between the hand movement (response) and
the visual effect of this movement on the screen.
As Fagard et al. (2014) state, the development of tool use
in human infants has received little interest until recently. For
example, an unresolved issue is whether tool use appears through
sudden insight or emerges progressively through familiarization
with experience. Fagard et al. (2014) address this issue by con-
ducting a longitudinal study on five infants from age 12 to 20
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months. Children have to use a rake-like tool to reach toys pre-
sented out of reach. Their results indicate that it is only between
16 and 20 months that the infants suddenly start to intentionally
try to bring the toy closer with the tool. For them, this sudden suc-
cess at about 18 months might correspond to the coming together
of a variety of capacities, such as the development of means-end
behavior.
Tools are also specific because they modify our perception of
the world. For instance, it is known that using a tool can alter
space perception in that far stimuli become processed as if they
were nearer (Maravita and Iriki, 2004; Witt et al., 2005; Osiurak
et al., 2012). Likewise, body representations can bemodified when
using a tool so that the tool is incorporated and becomes part
of our body (Iriki et al., 1996; Cardinalli et al., 2009). An inter-
esting issue, however, is whether these modifications only occur
after the real use of tools or can also appear in a tool-use imagery
condition. Baccarini et al. (2014) provide a positive answer to this
issue by showing that tool-use imagery is sufficient to affect the
representation of the user’s arm.
In line with the view of common representations for percep-
tion, imagery, and action, Kelly and Wheaton (2013) investigate
the understanding of tool-use actions viewed from different per-
spectives and conclude that perception and understanding is
facilitated when tool-use actions are viewed from an egocentric
(as opposed to allocentric) perspective.
Finally, two theoretical papers also contribute to this special
topic on broader issues. In line with the extended mind view,
Borghi et al. (2013) suggest that words can be conceived as quasi-
external devices (or tools) that extend our cognition. For example,
words function like tools because they also enlarge the bod-
ily space of action and, as a result, modify our sense of body.
Baber et al. (2014) propose the notion of distributed cognition
to account that tool use is not only based on internal representa-
tions (e.g., manipulation knowledge or mechanical knowledge)
but also external representations such as the location of tools
within the workspace.
In sum, this special issue includes a series of articles from neu-
ropsychology, neuroimaging, experimental psychology, develop-
mental psychology, and ergonomics that provide very interesting
findings and open new issues for future research on the topic. Let’s
hope that we possess the good tools to solve them!
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